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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ENGINEERING COMMISSION, D.
H. WHITTENBURG, Chairman, H.
J. CORLEISSEN and LAYTON
MAXFIELD, Members of the Engineering Commission,
Plaintiff a-nd Appellant,
Case No. 7939

vs.

FRED TEDESCO and KLEA B. TEDESCO, his wife, et al,
Defendants,
and
BIRD & EVANS, INC.
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT
BIRD & EVANS, INC.

INTRODUCTION
·This matter comes before the Court on an intermediate
appeal granted .to the State of Utah after a jury had been
3
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chosen and the presentation of evidence had begun in the
courfbelow. The questions to be determined by this Court are:
_ 1. Does the respondent, Bird & Evans, Inc., have a legal

remedy for the damages which it has suffered and which are
the subject of this action; and
2. Has the respondent, Bird & Evans, Inc., proceeded

properly to

secu~e

legal redress for these damages.

STATEMENT ·oF FACT
The statement of fact as presented by the appellant is
· a_ccurat~ so far as it pertains to the quotation of the statutes
condemning or directing the condemnation of the land for
C<This is' the Place" Monument
The appellant fails; however, to mention in its Statement
of Facts the interesting history of legislation concerning "This
is the Place'' Mo~ument in t~e Second _Special Session of the
Twenty-Ninth Legislature jn June of 1952. Th~se facts arc
important as they bear upon the intention of the Legislature
in regard to the condemnation of Kennedy Drive.
H. B. No. 3 of the Second Special Session provided

111

Section 1 thereof:
''The action taken by the Engineering Con1tnissiOil
in condemning the land in the vicinity of ''This is the
Place" monument for state park purposes pursuant to
the provisions of Chapter 75, La\vs of Ut~h. 1951. as
amended my Chapter 13, Laws of Utah, 1951. First
Special Session, and more particularly, its action in not

-1
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condemning public utility easements and that portion
of Kennedy Drive embraced within the limits of the
park area is approved and ratified.*
When H.B. No. 3 came before the House of Representatives on the third reading, Section 1 above quoted \Vas by
amendment deleted from the Bill in its entirety and the remaining Sections renumbered accordingly. (Page 20, Journal
of the I-Iouse of Representatives Second Special Session
of ihe. T\venty-Ninth Legislature.)
Immediately thereafter H.B. No.· 3 'vas withdra\vn and
H.B. No. 5 was substituted in its place. H.B. No. 5 contained
all of the salient points of H.B. No. 3 except the reference
· 'to Kennedy Drive. It even grants to the State' Engineering
Con1mission authority to grant easements across the coi1den1ned
property for public utilities which provision had been stricken
from H.B. ·No. 3 along with the reference to Kennedy Drive.
H.B. No. 5 was thereupon passed by the Legislature, signed
by the Governor, and became a statute of the State of Utah.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THIS ACT IS NOT BARRED BY THE PROVISIONS
OF RULE 13 (a), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

* Actually Kennedy Drive was condemned, because the description contained in the Legislative Act, in the Resolution of the
Engineering Commission, and in the Complaint filed, included
Kennedy Drive and made no exception therefor.
5
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The appellant makes the contention that the action of Bird
& Evans, Inc., for damage to the upper property is cut off because of the fact that Bird.& Evans, Inc., did not file its counterclaim or cross-complaint alleging damages to the property
prior to the time the hearing of the court was had fixing the
valu~ of the property specifically described in the Complaint.
The respondent does not feel that this position is \\·ell taken.
The Compulsory. Counter-Claim Rule has t\vo fundamental
bases~ First to conserve the time of the court by handling in
· a single hearing as many issues as can properly be handled, and
Second so that if there are justified off-setting claims bern'een
the same parties, these claims can be set-off one against the
other to result in a lower single judgment rather than in two
separate judgments r:unning in different directions bet\vecn the
t\vo parties. Neither of these reasons is applicable here. Although there is only one law suit bearing a single number
covering all lands involved in the ctThis is the Place 11onument"
action, because of the fact that the issues as to the various parcels were so diversified and would be so confusing to a single
jury, the court has conducted numerous hearings under the
same case, grouping the matters that had the greatest points
in common in a single hearing. Even if the counter-claitn haJ
been on file and at issue at the time of the hearing assessin.~
the value of the first piece of property, it would not have been
heard by the court at that time because of the fact that the
issues were so different; and, as indicated above the segregation
by the judge of this case into various trials, was a segregation
as to issues, rather than as to parties defendant. The titne t~f
the court therefore would not have been conserved at all by
the procedure suggested by the appellant.
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The second reason for the. compulsory counter-claim rule
is equally inapplicable here. There are not and could not be
two judgments running in different directions between the
parties to this action. Although the State is designated as party
plaintiff in a condemnation action, the judgment actually runs
in favor of the defendants. In this case, therefore, if two judgn1ents were rendered, one as to the value of the land actually
taken and one for damages to the land not taken, both judgments 'vould run against the State and in favor of Bird &
Evans, Inc. There could, therefore, be no off-set.
The attention of the court is further called to the fact
that this cross-complaint was filed in the same action and before
the action had been disposed of. At the time the Bird & Evans,
Inc., cross-complaint or counter-claim was filed, although a
hearing had been had as to the value of the Bird & Evans,
Inc., property actually taken, (which property was neither
adjacent to nor in close proximity to Kennedy Drive or to
the property of the respondent involved in these proceedings
and which was damaged by the condemnation of Kennedy
Drive) there were many hearings yet to be conducted in the
same case. The case was, therefore, very much alive and the
counter-claim is filed in the same case as that originally brought
by the State.
This situation is clearly covered by sub-section (e) of
Rule 13, which states:
CCWhen a pleader fails to set up a counter-claitn
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect,
or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set
up the counter-claim by amendn1ent."
7
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Certainly in this case the interests of justice required filing
of the counter-claim, as without the counter-clairn it may \vell
have been that under the case of Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 241
Pac. ( 2d) 907, Bird & Evans, Inc. might have had no remedy
except to petition the Board of Examin~rs, which n1atter \viii
· be discussed later in this brief. Clearly it appears therefore,
that the matter of setting up counterclaims by amendment in
the same action before the action had been finally tenninated,
is within the discretion of the trial court. The trial court permitted such a filing in this case and proceeded to trial thereon,
as it clearly had the right to do under the rule quoted above.

POINT TWO
. THE STATUTE AND THE FILING OF Tl-IE CO~f
.PLAINT CONSTITUTE .~.\. CONDEMNATION OF KENNEDY DRIVE.

(a) The language of the. statttte clearly indicates
tent 0!2 the part of the Legislature.

Jll(b

in-

The attention of the court is called to the fact that the
Act of the Legislature, as amended by the First Special Session
of 1951, leaves no discretion \vithin the Road Comn1ission as
to whether or not it shall condemn certain lands described
therein. The Commission is directed to proceed to conJemn the
described lands which include Kennedy Drive, and is given
discretion as to certain other lands. Pursuant to this mandate
the Engineering Con1mission did file a cotnpL1int in its condetnnation of the mandatory lands not excluding the ref ron1
8
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Kennedy Drive. The court did not rule, as the appellant has
n1aintained, that the Legislature· s Act in itself constituted a
condemnation. Although respondent feels that such a ruling
\vould have been justified, the court held that" the enactment
of the statute plus the resolution of the engineering commission and the filing of the con1plaint constituted the act of
conden1nation. This is clearly indicat~d by certain language
of the court \vhich has been entirely omitted from the Statement of Fact of the appellant. The language of the court
in making its ruling is found at page 91 of the record and
reads as follo\vs:
"1;Ir. Rampton: "We would like the Court to take judicial notice of the act of the Legislature and to take notice of
the resolution of the Road Commission, which is pleaded in
full in the complaint and, based upon that, to make an order
to the effect that the lands embraced therein, including Kennedy Dricve, have been condemned." * * *
"The Court: The order as indicated by !vfr. Rampton \vill
be granted."
It may be conceded that as a general rule the Legislative
Act in and of itself is not an act of condemnation because as
a usual thing no specific land is· described in the statute, put
a considerable discretion is left to the administrative agency
charged v.rith the taking of the property. As pointed out abo\re,
such is not the case here. The administrative. agency \vas directed to condemn certain described land. In this regard the
following language is found in Nichols on Eminent Domain
( 6.13):
9
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((The mere passage of legislation authorizing the
acquisition of property by eminent domain is . ordinarily not sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute a
taking. Where, however, the provisions of the statute
and the circumstances under which the appropriation
is to· take place are such as to indicate that the purpose
of the law ·was to effect a taking by virtue of the
statute itself, it has been held that a statute mav be
so construed as to vest title in fhe condeniner t;pon
the mere passage of the law."
In Lewis on" Eminent.Domain at page 375 it is stated:
••.It is competent for the legislature to appropriate
property directly by an act duly passed, instead of confering authority to do so, and this has occasionally been
done."
·
The attention of the court is called to the fact that the
property in . this ca~e had been acquired by the land owner
for the purpose of sub-dividing for sale as residen.tial property
and indeed at the time. of t~1e condemnation the property
had been platted and the owner was proceeding with subdivision work. The minute the act in question was passed the
land became worthless as sub-division lots. No person intending
.to. build a house would buy a lot where the only access road
to the lot was encompassed in land which the Legislature.
by a statute, had directed to be taken for public park purposes.
Granted the land still had some value. A sub-division speculator might· still buy the land at· some price in the hope that
access to the area would some day be made possible through
the opening of Kennedy Drive or other streets into the area.
Ho\vever, without question, the value of the land for sale as
sub-division lots was materially reduced by. the action of the
Legislature.
10
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The same question arose in the case of Chelten Trust Co.
v. Blankenburg, Pa., 88 Atl. 664. There a city ordinance· declared that a certain tract of land had be·en selected and appropriated for park purposes. In holding that the act of the
City Council in effect amounted to a taking, the court stated:
nAppellees' land was practically taken and appropriated by the ity of Philadelphia, the day the ordi- .
nance was passed ... The land cannot be built upon
or improved except at the hazard of the improver and
it is \vorthless for sale."
Another case almost directly in point with the case no\v
before the court is the case of People ex rel Canavan y. Collis,
46 N.Y. Supp. 727. There the Legislat~re adopted a certain
statute regarding certain described lands and declared them
to be a public parkway' and required the municipal authorities
of the City of New York at once, in the manner described in the
act, to condemn the property and have the value appraised.
The court pointed out that this New York Statute, as in the
case of the Utah statute now before this court,. provided a
complete scheme for the condemnation of the property and
the payment to owners. The court stated:
((Fron1 the time of the passage of the Act and cer·
tainly · from the time when the lands therein \vere
located by the filing of the n1ap, they were fully appropriated an.d set apart for public u~e, and the duty
of taking proceedings to appraise their value arose ...
The law gave to the municipal authorities of the C~ty
of New York no locus poenitentiae, or right to discontinue the proceedings, but the statute tnade it
obligatory upon them not only to take the proceedings
for condemnation, but to pursue them to a final report.
11
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The case is not one where it lay in the discretion of
the Commissioner of Public Works or the Department
of Public Works whether or not to take the land, or
whether or not to continue proceedings \vhich had once
begun for the condemnation of land; but the takin~
of this land was the act of the legislature, and th~
absolute duty of having it appraised was imposed upon
the city, without any right or power to discontinue it.
The rights of the parties, so far as the taking of the
land is concerned, were fixed by the statute."
To like effect see 1tlcMormock v. City of Brooklyn. 14 NE
848, and Mott et al v. Eno, 74 N.E. 229.
The appellant has cited the. United States Supreme Court
case of Danforth v. United- States, 308 U.S. 271; 84 L. Ed.
240, 246 and 247; 60S. Ct. 231, to the effect that a legislative
act does not constitute condemnation. An examination of this
case will definitely indicate that it is not in point. The court
states:
nThe mere enactment of legislation which tllttborizcJ
a condemnation of property cannot be a taking.··
In this case, however, we do not have an act authorizing condemnation, we have a statute directing it. In his dissenting
opinion in the case of Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard
Min. Co., 196 U.S. 239, 25 S. Ct. 251, 258; 49 L.Ed. 462, quoted
vvith approval of Judge Wolfe in the case of State v. District
Court, Fourth Judicial District, 78 Pac. ( 2d) 502, Justice
Holn1es stated:
"The fundamental fact is that en1inent dotnain is
a prerogative of the state, which, on the one hat~d tnay
be exercised in any \vay that the state thinks ht. and
on the other n1ay not be exercised except by an authority
12
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which the state confers. The taking rnay be direct, by
an act of the LegiJiature ... "
The appellant also contends that it was never the intention
of the Legislature to condemn Kennedy Drive. While no one
can say for sure what was in the minds ·of various legislators,
the only assumption to be drawn from the language of the
legislators \vas that such \vas their intention. Kennedy Drive
is definitely encompassed within the tract of land described.
The Engineering Commission is directed, without the exercise
of any discretion on its part, to proceed to condemn such land.
Furthermore, as has been pointed out above, the Engineering
Commission made an effort to have Kennedy Drive deleted
from the description of the property. This provision was embraced in a bill introduced in the Legislature, which bill contained a number of other provisions affecting the Monun1ent
property. The bill was finally passed substantially as introduced, except that the provision exempting Kennedy Drive from
the provisions of the condemnation statute was . stricken by
amendment. Certainly this shows an affirmative intention on
the part of the Legislature that Kennedy Drive should not be
excepted.
Generally, it may be said that the land encompassed \Vithin
the description contained in the· statute falls into three categories so far as ownership is concerned.
(a) That land belonging to private owners which
certainly the Legislature intended to condemn and
'Nhich the State has proceeded to take and pay for.
(b) The land across which ran Stat~ Road No. 65,
'\vhich already belonged to the State and \vhich there

13
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would be no purpose in condemning as the State could
already do whatever it wished with the land; and
(c) The city and county streets encompassed within
the area, including Kennedy Drive.
As pointed out above, the argument that if the Legislature
intended to condemn Kennedy Drive it also intended to condemn State Road No. 65 is without force or effect whatsoever.
Why would the State proceed to condemn land which already
belonged to it? If it did i~tend to proceed with the conden1riation, what effect would it have? The answer is obvious none whatever. If the State wanted to devote the land currently used· for highway purposes for park purposes, it could
do so without an act of condemnation, although by so doing
it might subject itself to some liability, but certainly a condemnation action was not necessary.
In regard to the city and county streets, however, if the
Sta.te was to acquire title, a .condemnation action was necessary
as· the title was vestecl elsewhere. It was obviously the intention
of the State to acquire a large ~ract of land for park purposes.
1~he land, prior to the condemnation act, consisted of individual building lots plus numerous streets serving such lots for
residential purposes. Obviously no park could be built on an
area cut up by such streets. An examination of the n1ap attached
to appellant's Brief will show that in addition to Kennedy
Drive, lands belonging to the city or county were lands traversed by Oakhills Drive, Crest\vood Drive, Oak\vood Drive, Oakwood Circle and a number of other streets not sho\v n on that
plat. What is there to indicate that the Legislature had any
different intention toward Kennedy Drive than it had toward
1l
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Crest\\'ood Drive or Oakhills Drive? The O\vnership of all
these lands _,vas in a party other than the State. They had all
been dedicated to the county by the same instrument. All o~
them provided possible access to land lying east of the Monument property. If the Legislature did not intend to condemn
these road,vays, then it did not intend to condemn a continuous
area for park purposes, but rather it intended to take a number
of small disconnected pieces. Such can obviot~sly not be the.
case. Whether or not the Legislature realized that by condemning these county or c;:ity roads it might be cutting off property
o\vners to the· east from their property, we cannot kno,v, but
certainly it could not have intended that such roadways be
exempted frqm the condemnation suit, otherwise, as pointed
out above, it v1ould not have the continuous area for park purposes that was obviously desired.
As a further evidence of the legislative intent, \Ve call
attention to the_ fact that the primary act directing the taking
of the properties for {{This is the Place', Monument park,
passed by the general session of the Legislature in 1952 and
\vhich included the area comprising Kennedy Drive in the
description of the land to be taken, stated that one of the purposes of taking the property was to. preserve nt~e natural
beauty of the area surrounding,, the monutnent. The Legislature subsequently authorized the Engineering Commission to
sell and remove from the area the beautiful and expensive
homes which had been erected thereon. The inference to be
drawn from this is a legislaitve intent to elin1inate improvetnents of every nature which had been· placed upon this property, including roads placed thereon. This conclusion. is inescapable in vie·w of the fact that, as. pointed out. above, the

15
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question of excepting Kenndey Drive from the land to be
condemned was expressly called to the attention of the Legislature and it declined to make such an exception.

(b) The Legislative Act and the Resolution of the Road
Co1nnzission Established the Necessity for Taking.

The appellant raises the point that there had never been
a ·determination that the use of the land for park purposes
was a higher use than for use as a public way. Likewise that
there has never been a determination by the court as such that
the establishment of the park was in the public interest.
In support of this position appellant cites the case of To,vn
of Perry v. Thomas, 22 Pac. (2d) 343, ignoring entirely the
fact that the Court there held that the resolution of the Road
Commission, in the absence of fraud, is conclusive evidence
of. the necessity of taking. The language of the Court is as
follows:
((Under powers thus delegated. to n1unicipal boards
the necessity, expediency, or propriety of opening a
public street or way is a political question, and in the
absence of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion the
action of such board will not be disturbed by the
courts. 10 R.C.L. 183, 184; 4 McQuillin or Municipal
Corporations (2d Ed.) 367; 20 C.J. 559, 627, 972~
Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Oregon S.L.R. Co., 23 lJtah,
474, 65 P. 73·5, 90 Am. St. Rep. 705; City of Grafton
v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 16 N.D. 313, 113 N. W.
598, 22 L.R.A. (NS) 1, and notes; City of Los Angeles
v Waldron, 65 Cal. 283, 3 P. 890; City of Seattle v.
Byers, 54 Wash. 518, 103 P. 791; Grangeville Hi~h
\vay Dist. v. Ailshie, 49 Idaho, 603, 290 P. 717."
16
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In this very action the Attorney General's office, acting
for the State of Utah, has proceeded to condemn extensive
tracts of land, introducing no other evidence as to the necessity
of the taking than the statute and resolution of the Road Con1mission itself. It is now trying to blow hot and cold in the
same case. In fact, it has switched its position on this very
point since the case was argued before Judge Van Cott. There,
\\·hen the matter came up as to whether or not the resolution
and the statute were evidence of the necessity for taking, Mr.
Quentin Alston, representing the State, said:
"I think the resolution presents a prima facie case,
Your Honor." (P. 84 Transcript).
If the resolution supported by the staute made a prima facie
case as to the other pieces of land embraced within the condemnation action, certainly it made a prima facie case as to
all lands embraced therein, and whether or not the legislative
act itself was a condemnation, certainly based upon such resolution, the court had the power to enter an order of copdemnation, which it did.
In this regard the following language 1s found at 2
Nichols on Eminent Domain,· page 908:
"It is equally obvious that ·as there is no fixed principal which decides what public improvements shall be
undertaken and where they shall be lo~ated, these
questions must be settled by some department of the
Governn1ent. It does not, however, follo\v merely because such questions are often open to doubt and because evidence and argument might be of assistance
in coming to a decision, that they are necessarily judicial
17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and must be passed upon by the courts. Just as it is exclusively in the power of the Legislature except so
far as it is limited by the provisions of the constitution
to provide what police regulations shall be enacted,
what ·taxes shall be levied and what the duties of the
various public officers shall be, so it is \Vithin the
exclusive jurisdiction of the same body to determine
what public improvements shall be constructed, where
they shall be located and where the power of eminent
domain shall be employed at acquire the necessary title.
Where the Legislature authorizes the exercise of en;inent domain in a particular case, it is necessttrily adjudicated· that the land to be taken is needed for tbe
. public ttse and no other· or further adjudicctfion is
necessary."
As further answer to appellant's argument in this regard,
\Ve point out the fact that Sec. 78-34-4 ( 3) relied upon by
appellant is but a statutory provision covering the procedure
for the taking of property under ·the general condemnation
laws of the state, and cannot control these proceedings \vhich
are based upon special acts of the Legislature. In fact, if there
is any conflict between that section and the special acts directing the taking of the lands affected by these proceedings, the
provisions of Sec. 78-34-4. (3) must yield to the later and
specific statutes directing the condemnation of the property
for CCThis is the Place" Monument park.

POINT THREE
RESPONDENT HAS PURSUED ITS PROPER RElv1EDY TO OBTAIN REDRESS FOR ITS DAMAGES.
18
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The appellant did not maintain in the Court below, nor
did it n1aintain in its brief to this court that, if the respondent's
right of access to its property is actually interferred with by
the condemnation action, there has not been a taking or damaging V\'ithin the contemplation of Article 1, Section 22 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah. That the respondent has
been damaged is quite clear. It is true that up to the present time
Kennedy Drive has not been physically ·closed, and that all
persons have been permitted, to drive over it. This, however,
has been a pennissive thing, the right of respondents and
others to use said street having been taken from them by the
taking of the property described in the Complaint in this action.
As has been pointed out abov~, Birds & Evans, Inc.,
\vere proceeding to sub-divide these lots for sale as sub-division
property. As such, and if served by _a city street, . they had a
very substantial value for residential purposes. Hov;ever, as
quickly as the right of access was taken away and access remained purely on a. permissive basis, the lots had no value at
all for residential purposes.
Let us suppose that a prospective purchaser wished to buy
a lot for construcing a home, which lot was entirely surrounded
by property belonging to another individual. Let us further
suppose that with a right of \vay across the lands of the other
individual, the prospective buyer was wiiling to pay $10,000.00
for the residential lot. Let us suppose further that rather than
granting a right of way across his other property, the property
O\\'ner rnerely said, ('I will give you permission to go across my
property to get to your lot, such permission to be revocable
by me at any time. I may never revoke it and so you \Yill prob-
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ably always have access., Under such circumstances no person
would buy such a lot for residential· use as he would not feel
safe in constructing a house on it. This is the situation in regard to the Bird & Evans, Inc., property. Prior to the condemnation action, the land had a certain value for residential
purposes, while after the right of access became in doubt, it
had no value for such purposes except a speculative value.
Certainly we would not be entitled to a judgment for the value
of· the land as would be the case if the land were actually
taken, because we still have the land and it still has some value.
Access up the side of the mountain could be had to it for the
purpose of grazing goats, and it would have some value for
this purpose. Furthermore, it is probable that a person wishing
to buy it for speculation for residential purposes would pay
some figure more than a pasture land value on it in _the hope
that sometime in the future Kennedy ~rive would be reopened
or that streets would b~ opened into it from sotne other source.
The measure of our damages is the difference between
\vhat a willing buyer would pay for the tract for its highest
and best use before the condemnation action and \vhat he \vould
pay for it after the condemnation action. Nor have our damages
been nullified or our right taken away by the fact that the
last session of the Legislature did in fact reopen Kennedy Drive.
As a legal proposition this makes no difference. The following
language is found at Vol. 18 of American Jurisprudence, Stc.
280:

"The right to damages becomes perfect \vhen the
street is vacated, and cannot be diminished by any action which the plaintiff may, in the future, take for
the purpose of mitigating the injuries done to hin1. as.
20
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for exan1ple, by his subsequent! y opening streets on
his "land by means of \vhich access and egress to and
from they may be had."
This matter was before the Supreme Court of Washington
in the case of Fry v. O'Leary, 252 Pac. 111, where the court
held that \vhen a street was vacated, the right of the O\vner to
damag~s became vested and the fact that other access was later
acquired n1ade no difference.
As a practical matter we still have suffered severe dan1ages.
We have suffered the damage o.f being delayed two" years in
the development of the sub-division. Our money has been tied
up in the 1and for this period of time and it may be that the
evidence will show a diminution in value of residential property over that period of time.
Taking then the proposition that v.;e have been damaged
within the contemplation of the constitution, the last question
arises as to whether we have taken the proper legal steps for
the redress of these damages. This court has recognized in
the cases of State v. District Cour~, Fourth Judicial Dist.,
78 P. (2d) 502 and the case of Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 241
P. (2d) 907, the 4octrine of the non-suability of the sovereign.
While counsel feels that this is an outmoded doctrine held
over from the theory of the divine right of kings, nevertheless,
it appears to be well established in our law. It tnay further
\vell be the law as set forth by Judge Wolfe in his dissenting
opinion in State v. District Court, Fourth Judicial Dist. 78
P. (2d) 502, that the mere fact that the constitution gives
a right of action in cases of property not taken, does not in1ply
a consent of the state to be sued and that in many cases the
21
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only remedy for the injured party is by appeal to the Board of
Examiners.
However, equally well established with the doctrine of
the non-suability of the sovereign is the doctrine that when
the sovereign itself invokes the jurisdiction of the court, it
. becames subject to the jurisdiction of the court in all matters
properly cognizable by the court in such an action~ The sovereign cannot use the court as a sword to obtain its rights and
then in the same matter retire behind the shield of sovereign
immunity when it wishes to escape the consequence of its
original invocation of the court's jurisdiction. Here the state
did invoke the jurisdiction of the court to aid it in its conden1nation of the property concerned. Had Bird & Evans,
Inc., not been a party defendant to the original action, they had
a statutory right to intervene in the action to get redress for
any damages they sustained from the action. Section 78-34-7,
U.C.A., 1953, provides:
ctAll persons in occupation of, or having or claiming
an interest in, any of the property described in the
complaint, or in the damages for the taking thereof,
though not named, may appear, plead an.d defend, each
in respect to his own property or interest, or that claimed by him, in. the same manner as if narned in the
complaint."
In this case, however, Bird & Evans, Inc. were already
parties to the suit and intervention was not necessary. They
sought relief by means of a counterclaim or cross-complaint,
whichever term is proper to apply to the pleading.
Sec. 78-34-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953·, contemplates
having the court award damages against the state in con22

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

demnation actions for datnages to property, no part of which
is taken. Only \vhere the state has not invoked the jurisdiction
of the court, as was true in the case of State v. District Court,
Fourth Judicial District, 78 Pac. ( 2d) 502, or in cases where
the injured parties have not by a timely action, had their
damages a~sessed in the condemnation action, as was the case
of Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 241 Pac.. (2d) 907, does the appeal
to the Board of Examiners become the exclusive remedy. T'he
statutory section above cited provides:
(<The Court, jury or referee must hear such legal evi-:
dence as may be offered by any of the parties to the
proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess:

( 1) The value of the property sought to be conden1ned and all improvements thereon appertaining to the
realty, and of each and every separate estate or interest
therein; and if it consists of different parcels, the value
of each parcel and of each estate or. interest therein
shall be separate! y assessed.

( 2) If the property sought to be condernned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages which
will acrue to the portion not sought to be condernned
by reason of its severance frotn the portion sought to
be condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff.

( 3) If the property, though no part thereof is taken,
will be da1naged by the construction of the proposed
i1npruuenzent. the anzount of such danzages .....
Attention of the court is called to the fact that this section is not pern1issive, but mandatory. It states: ((The Court,
jury or referee nutJt hear such evidence as may be ~ffered by
any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon nutst
7,
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ascertain and assess" the compensation and damages .. To \vhat
else could sub-section ( 3) of the above quoted statute apply
than to a case like that now before the court? It is certain
that the. State itself "rould never set up in its complaint in a
conden1nation action that it was injuring .property, no part
of which was taken. As has been very clearly pointed out by
Judge Wolfe in his dissenting opinion in State v. District
Court, Fourth Judicial District, 78 Pac. ( 2d) 502, neither
the State nor the co~rt could know with certainty what individuals n1ight be damaged where no part of their property was
.being taken. Therefore, if sub-section ( 3) is to have any application at all, it must apply to those cases where the O\vners
of the property, by appropriate pleading, have brought before
the court the fact that they have been damaged. This the respondent has done in this case. It has set up a counterclain1 or cross-complaint right in the condemnation action
itself. The State has invoked the jurisdiction of the court. The
statute provides for the redress of the damages by the court
to the owners of the property injured, but not taken. Certainly,
therefore, we are properly before the court and need not rely
upon the Board of Examiners for redress of our in juries.

CONCLUSION
The respondent feels and urges upon the court that the
act of the Legislature in this case in itself constituted a taking
of Kennedy Drive and· a damaging of its property. If the legislative act standing alone did not do that, then certainly the
Jegislative act, plus the filing of the action \VOu}d have that

2i
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effect. If the court will not go this far, then certainly it cannot
be doubted that the legislative act, plus the filing of the action,
plus the order of the district court o·rdering conden1nation in
compliance with the mandate of the Legislature and the resolution of the Engineering Commission, constituted such condemnation. If it did not accomplish that in regard to Kennedy
Drive, then it did not accomplish it in regard to any of the
lands and the State has not properly taken any of the _property
for the monument site. It is true that in this case the defendants
rather than the State urged upon the court the entry of the ·
order of condemnation on the basis of the statute and the
resolution. This, hov1ever, was done not to create a cause of
action, but because it was felt by counsel that this offered the
only method of securing judicial redress for an injury already
done.
The respondent has suffered substantial damage as a result of the condemnation of ·the monument property. They
have applied for redress in a case in which. the State itself
has invoked the jurisdiction of the court. It is submitted that
the action of the lower court should be sustained and the
lower court should be permitted to proceed with the assessment of the respondent's damages under the prov1s1ons of
Sub-section (3) of 78-34-10, U.C.A., 1953.
Respec_tfully submitted,
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMP'TON

Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent, Bird & Ev?tns, Inc.
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